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N ote  about the A uthor
REGIN ALD II. GREEN, Professorial Fellow o f  the Institute o f  Development 
Studies at the University o f  Sussex, is w idely acknowledged as a leading 
authority on developm ent issues affecting sub-Saharan African econom ies and 
has published extensively on international developm ent issues. With over 100 
professional publications to his credit, in journals produced in all continents o f  
the globe, Professor Green has acted as a consultant econom ist for the 
International Labour O ffice, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the United Nations Institute for Namibia, the Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Com m ittee (L on don ), the World Council o f  
Churches, the Com m onwealth Secretariat, the International Foundation for 
Development Alternatives, the Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(L on don), and various international donor agencies. He has also been an 
econom ic advisor to the Tanzanian Governm ent (1966 -1974), the South West 
Africa People’s Organisation, Front Line States and various other African 
governments during the course o f  the last 15 years. In 1964, Professor Green was 
a participant at the International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa 
(L ondon).
The Series
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AG AIN ST SOUTH AFR ICA is a collection  o f  
research studies directed at evaluating the case and prospects for an international 
policy o f  econom ic sanctions, designed to eliminate apartheid. It addresses 
various facets o f  this question — the origins, nature and character o f  sanctions 
applied or proposed, measures which could  still be em ployed at the international 
and national levels, choices between options, the constraints which might 
potentially arise in sanctions application, the implications and im pact o f  various 
forms o f  sanctions on South Africa and neighbouring econom ies, possible 
offsetting contingency arrangements that could be organised to assist affected 
countries, and various positive consequences that might be anticipated from  the 
comprehensive application o f  co-ordinated and multilateral sanctions policy. The 
studies were undertaken over the period June 1979 to April 1980 and were 
supported financially from  contributions made by the Swedish International 
Development Authority (SID A ), as well as in other ways by non-governmental 
organisations in Europe and elsewhere, in addition to numerous individuals in 
official and private capacities. The various contributions have been organised to 
provide specialised inputs into current debates and to  assist governments, 
international bodies, UN agencies, as well as liberation movements, in the 
formulation o f  policy  towards apartheid South Africa. The views expressed by 
individual authors do not necessarily reflect those o f  either the IUEF or 
organisations and individuals which have supported the project.
P R E F A C E
One o f  the most pressing matters concerning policy matters involved with 
decisions on econom ic sanctions vis-a-vis South Africa relates to the impact 
which the policy might have on the neighbouring econom ies o f  the region, both 
in the short and long term. In this report, the author reviews various options and 
scenarios and ascertains that the effects could be substantial. Not all, however, 
would be negative, since the thrust o f  sanctions w ould be to hasten an already 
specified policy , adopted by m ost states, o f  reducing econom ic dependence on 
the Republic.
Apart from assessing the impact o f  sanctions, considerable attention is given 
to various adjustment possibilities both on a regional and national basis as well as 
international support mechanisms and options which could in the end make 
sanctions a viable proposition. Even though the costs o f  sanctions are shown to 
be high in certain areas and for particular econom ies — the exercise is not 
sanguine on this score — it is also stressed that such a realistic assessment does 
not am ount to any case against sanctions. Many o f  the affected countries are 
already disposed to support sanctions, their alternative at som e point in the 
future being a form  o f forced participation in a major tragedy arising from  a 
crisis in South Africa which promises to be potentially even more costly  and 
damaging.
The careful arguments advanced, illustrating links between sanctions policies 
and the situation in neighbouring econom ies in respect to petroleum , finance, 
food , transport systems, em ploym ent, trade and independence from  the 
Republic, provide considerable fo o d  for thought — for national governments 
which need to make contingency plans, for  international support agencies, and 
all others concerned to see the elimination o f  apartheid in South A.frica. The 
various interdependencies shown between national and regional solutions to 
possible future problem s are spelt out in much detail. As the author concludes: 
“ Econom ic Sanctions remain the on ly  serious proposal on the international
agenda which appears to have som e potential for forcing South A fr ic a .............
into negotiations for systematic transform ation” .
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Evaluations o f  the impact o f  sanctions against the Republic o f  South Africa 
(R SA ) on neighbouring Southern African states (Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, 
M ozam bique, Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Zim babw e, Namibia) can vary 
widely, indeed w ildly.1 At one extreme, som e scenarios can be constructed 
showing total breakdown in trade systems and commercialised production  with 
literal starvation suggested in som e cases. At the other extreme, one could sketch 
the result o f  sanctions to include a rapid extrication from  dependence on the 
RSA and attainment o f  a more self-reliant and regionally-linked developm ent 
pattern.2
The divergence appears to stem from  three causes:
a) different scenarios cover different countries;
b) different degrees o f  accuracy are used to evaluate the present econ om ic links 
with RSA and, equally, how realistic as well as how  costly  are available and
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viable alternatives to them ?;3 
c) different assumptions are made in respect o f  the potential pre-sanctions 
planning which could take place in Southern Africa, the degree o f  
international support for the resulting adjustments, and the length and 
comprehensiveness implied by sanctions policies.4
1.1 M ethodology
This survey is based on the follow ing assumptions:
a) the scope covers the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, M ozam bique, 
Tanzania, Zambia) and Lesotho, Malawi, Zim babwe, Namibia and Swaziland.
b) there will be limited pre-planning for adjustment to sanctions along the 
general lines o f  present attempts to reduce dependence on  the R S A ;5
c) there would be coherent joint action by Front Line States, Swaziland and — 
if genuinely independent — Zim babwe and Namibia to minimise the costs o f  
sanctions, plus a limited international programme o f  assistance (with special 
reference to Lesotho);
d) consideration is given to an alternative “ scenario”  if Zim babwe and Namibia 
are not genuinely independent (or, if for one reason or another, the 
Zim babwe transport system is not w holly functional).
The survey seeks, firstly to sketch the present elements and patterns o f  • 
dependence and, secondly, to note recent trends in relation to the pattern o f  
dependence. This is follow ed by a sketch o f  the initial (unadjusted) im pact o f  
sanctions on the various econom ies and a review o f  national/regional adjustment 
possibilities. Thereafter, notes are provided on possible international 
contributions to the adjustment problem s which might arise and different 
patterns o f  exem ptions (e.g. for Lesotho) or sanctions coverage (e.g. petroleum 
and/or finance sanctions only) are examined. The concluding section outlines a 
possible post-adjustment position in terms o f  the costs and the potential positive 
development impact implied for Southern Africa as well as the corollary, a 
damaging impact on the RSA econom y from the application o f  sanctions by 
Southern African states.
The approach used is in principle politico-econom ic. It tends toward more 
narrow “ econom ism ”  in practice because o f  limitations on available data about 
the socio-political costs o f  sanctions as well as the feasibilities entailed in major 
sacrifices or costs for certain econom ies. The past ability o f  Zambia, Tanzania, 
Angola and M ozambique to endure sacrifices (both  in respect o f  Southern 
African liberation and other national goals or external shocks) w ithout either 
econom ic or political collapse has been high, but each o f  these polities (in 
somewhat different ways) is today severely overstrained and may, in certain 
respects, be approaching either technical or political breakdow o(s), although 
this, o f  course, varies in nature from  case to case.
Further, it is not possible at this stage to integrate into the analysis a range o f  
potential reactions emanating from  the RSA. If the RSA chose to b lock  key 
Southern African transport routes within the independent states (on  a basis 
analogous to their behaviour over June/N ovem ber 1979, follow ing attacks by 
the Rhodesian armed forces on the Botswana, Zambia, M ozam bique transport 
systems), the costs would exceed those posited in this report. In consequence, 
many o f  the adjustments suggested w ould be rendered im possible. Whether the 
Republic o f  South Africa would take such action depends on  whether it believes 
that the raising o f  costs to Southern African states w ould result in the lifting o f
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sanctions against, itself and, too , whether these counter-retaliatory measures 
•would lead to any effective international response. On the face o f  it, such tactics 
from  the liepublic would not be likely to cause the removal o f  econom ic 
sanctions, if they had been agreed to and comprehensively applied by the world 
com m unity. However, the lack o f  a military capacity to react by Front Line 
States, and o f  a demonstrated willingness to act by the international com m unity 
in response either to Rhodesian raids (either in respect o f  liberation m ovem ent 
bases or on dom estic Zambian, M ocam bican, and Angolan com m unications) or 
to South African incursions into Angola and Zambia, is so glaring that the RSA 
might be persuaded to  adopt such a “ forw ard”  military stance as one o f  its 
reactions to the im position o f  econom ic sanctions. While it is difficult to sec how 
the RSA could expect these actions to directly loosen sanctions, it is also hard to 
see what effective punitive action could  in fact be m ounted against the Republic 
from  within Southern Africa. Therefore, if econom ic sanctions were actually 
crippling the RSA, it might conceivably strike out in such an aggressive and 
militaristic manner.
2 E L E M E N T S  O F P R E S E N T  E C O N O M IC  D E P E N D E N C E  IN  T H E  
R E G IO N
The main areas o f  neighbouring state dependence on the Republic are in the 
follow ing spheres: transport and com m unications, fuel and energy, food , 
em ploym ent, high level skills and personnel, finance, and general im ports and 
exports. In each case, the current degree o f  dependence o f  different states varies 
sharply. Consider, briefly, each o f  these in turn.
a) Transport c.nd Com m unications6
Lesotho is 100 per cent dependent on  transport through the RSA. Botswana’ s 
transport, except by air, is almost equally dependent, unless and until the r ,:1 
route via Bulawayo to Beira is again usable. Swaziland’s transport is dominantly- 
linked to the South African system for imports, but largely via M ozam bique in 
respect o f  exports. Personnel, rolling stock  and rail maintenance facility linss, 
however, increase this degree o f  overall dependence. Zambia is currently 
significantly dependent on South African transport routes (as is Zaire) because 
o f  the physical destruction or crippling o f  its alternative rail and road route- • 
connected to M ozam bique and Tanzania and o f  the Angolan rail link. These five 
countries are now at present dependent on South African transportation ro tes.
The same has been true o f  Rhodesia and Namibia. On the other hand, for a 
genuinely independent Zim babwe, the dependence on South African transport 
would be much lower. Before UDI, bv contrast, South African routes were very 
much secondary- to M ocambican. T1 at situation can be restored by Zim babwe, 
assuming that the major deferred m tintenar.ee and damage on the Beira line is 
made good. Botswana and Zambia could then becom e much less dependent on 
South African routes because o f  an alternative route via Zim babwe to 
M ozam bique. In principle, a genuinely independent Namibia would have very 
little transport dependence on  South Africa. However the achievement o f  that 
result would require the creation o f  road and railway vehicle heavy maintenance 
capacity in Namibia rather than in the Cape Province, as currently prevails.
M ozam bique’s transport dependence on RSA is somewhat different. It is 
primarily a financial form  o f  dependence, because transit traffic for M ozam bique
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is a leading source o f  foreign exchange. Adm ittedly, this is critical ai present, but 
would certainly be less so under conditions o f  Zimbabwean independence and if 
Zim babwean/Zam bian traffic were again flowing through M ozam bique.
b) Fuel and E n ergy7
The BLS countries remain totally dependent on petroleum products derived 
from  the RSA. Only Swaziland at present has practicable transport access to a 
non-South African refinery. While Rhodesia and Namibia are also dependent on 
the RSA for petroleum products, an independent Zim babwe w ould presumably 
reactivate its own refinery, and a genuinely independent Namibia w ould have the 
capacity to im port directly.
In respect o f  electricity, Lesotho is totally dependent. Swaziland is 
significantly so, and Botswana continues to be marginally dependent on the RSA. 
M ozam bique, on the other hand, exports pow er to the RSA from  Tete (Cabora 
Bassa Dam) and reimports som e o f  it because o f  current limits to its dom estic 
transformer and grid systems. Namibia is dependent on the RSA for coal, used 
for smelting, and has no viable access (overland at least) to other Southern 
African collieries.
c) F ood 0
Lesotho and Swaziland, in som e years Botswana and at present Zambia, are 
also heavily dependent on staple fo o d  (maize and to a lesser extent wheat, 
vegetable oils and dairy products) from  the RSA. M ozam bique, too , has derived 
substantial maize imports from the RSA in som e post- independence years. In 
addition, Rhodesia may have becom e partially dependent on the Republic for 
grain, while Namibia remains very seriously dependent in respect o f  grains, sugar 
and vegetable oils. While a genuinely independent Zimbabwe would 
presumptively soon be self-sufficient in staple foods, a genuinely independent 
Namibia would in all probability remain dependent on staple fo o d  im ports for 
several years, but even Namibia might be expected to seek alternative sources to 
the RSA, even in the absence o f  sanctions.
d) E m ploym ent9
A bout 86 per cent o f  Lesotho’s, 50 per cent o f  Botswana’s, 20 per cent o f  
Swaziland’s, perhaps 15 per cent o f  Malawi’s and 15-20 per cent o f  
M ozam bique’s wage em ploym ent is located in the RSA — half to  two-thirds in 
mining sectors. The Lesotho case am ounts to near total dependence on the 
South African labour market, since a small proportion  o f  wage-labourers (one- 
seventh) located in Lesotho (as opposed to  in the RSA) is found in directly 
productive sectors.
The areas o f  origin o f  Botswana and M ocam bicans (and to som e degree 
Malawians and Swazis) em ployed in the RSA are also concentrated by region. 
Thus, dependence on em ploym ent in the Republic is much higher for these areas, 
from  which most o f  the workers com e, than for these econom ies taken either as 
a whole or as a group. This point has som e bearing on the impact e ffect which 
sanctions might precipitate.
e) Skilled P erson n el'0
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana (in directly productive sectors, but not 
government), Zambia (in mining), Malawi, Namibia and Rhodesia (in directly 
productive sectors, but not in government) are all in som e measure dependent on 
South African high and technically specialised middle-level personnel. This 
dependence is particularly marked in respect to mining. While a genuinely
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independent Zim babwe and Namibia would even in the absence o f  sanctions — 
seek to reduce dependence on South African personnel, they would most likely 
remain sigificantly dependent (especially in mining) for at least several years.
•
f) F inance11
South African financial flow s and banking institutions are dom inant in the 
case o f  Lesotho and in more or less equal measure in Swaziland as well as 
Namibia and Rhodesia where RSA-based transnational banks dom inate financial 
sectors. They are sigiHcant in respect to Botswana (for  private and joint venture 
sectors only) and in Malawi. The finance available for imports from the RSA is 
also probably currently significant for Zambia and possibly also for Zaire.
Following genuine independence, it is likely that Zim babwe and Namibia will 
becom e relatively rapidly de-linked from South African financial institutions and 
channels. In the case o f  Namibia, but not necessarily o f  Zim babwe, the same 
could be expected in respect to investment flows.
g) General Im ports 12
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia and possibly Rhodesia im port 
dom inantly from (as well as through) the RSA. In the first three cases, the 
dependence appears to exceed 90 per cent and in the fourth it may even be as 
high as 67-75 per cent. After genuine independence, Zim babwe and Namibia 
would be likely to diversify import sources rapidly, even in the absence o f  
sanctions.
Malawi secures about a quarter o f  its imports from  the RSA as, at present, 
does Zambia. The share o f  South A frica ’s portion o f  M ocambican imports is 
relatively low.
h) Export M arkets'12
Lesotho’s exports other than labour equal less than 10 per cent o f  imports. 
Moderate proportions o f  exports from Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi (other 
than labour) are sold to South Africa. M ozam bique’s exports to the RSA are 
basically pow er, transit services and labour — a significant proportion  o f  its total 
foreign exchange earnings. A bout 10 per cent o f  Botswana’s exports are used in 
the Republic. The share is much higher for meat products, but even there it is 
distinctly below  export levels to EEC markets. Perhaps a sixth o f  Swaziland 
exports are destined for the Republic. Manufactured exports — notably fertiliser 
and television sets — are dom inantly sent to the RSA as are timber products 
(largely mine props). Meat products are split between the RSA and EEC. Pulp, 
citrus, asbestos and sugar are not significantly dependent on South African 
markets. O f the new coal mines, one will be East Asian oriented and one 
European directed. Malawi exports som e agricultural products — especially tea — 
to South Africa, but these account for little over 5 per cent o f  exports in mos; 
years.
Namibian exports to the RSA are dom inant only in respect to cattle and -  
currently — fish products. A genuinely independent Namibia would be unlikely 
to maintain these patterns even in the absence oi sanctions. What proportion  o f  
Rhodesian exports are actually to — rather than through — the RSA is unclear, 
but it would probably be a figure under 20 per cent. A genuinely independent 
Z im babwe would be likely to sell a relatively low  proportion o f  its exports to 
RSA even in the absence o f  sanctions.
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3. R E C E N T  A L T E R A T IO N S  IN D E P E N D E N C E  P A T T E R N S  14
In respect o f  several Southern African states, there have been sharp changes in 
dependence patterns over the past few years. These have not all been in the same 
direction.
Since 1975, Angola has severed all links with South Africa. These connections 
were largely limited to external trade and were not dom inant even there.
M ozam bique has reduced its visible trade with South Africa as well as 
M ocambican em ploym ent in South Africa and has also virtually ended the use o f  
South African personnel and finance. It has at times called on specialist South 
African personnel in transport and mine rescue operations, but the form er have 
largely been phased out. M ozam bique has now begun to evolve and implement 
alternative, regionally-oriented trade and transport patterns, including the 
opening up o f  routes to Zim babwe. However, until these com e to fruition and 
Zim babwe is genuinely independent (and hence making full use o f  both 
M ocambican ports) South African transit traffic revenue will remain critical to 
M ozam bique, possibly more so than it has been in the past.
Tanzania has provided major investment allocations (20-25 per cent o f  the 
total 1965-1974 Domestic Fixed Capital Form ation) in alternative transport 
routes for Zambia and in building up an econom ic co-operation  programme with 
M ozam bique. (The severance o f  Tanzanie/RSA links in trade, air transport and 
em ploym ent came in 1961-1962 with internal self-government and 
independence.)
Malawi has somewhat reduced its em ploym ent dependence on the Republic 
o f  South Africa, with a 1974-1977 cu t-o ff o f  formal RSA mine recruitment in 
Malawi. However, it has increased its trade and financial links.
Botswana has increased its trade and is at present increasing its transport 
dependence on the RSA. However, as these are in part shifts away from  
Rhodesia, they could be quickly reversed follow ing genuine independence in 
Zimbabwe. Even so, Botswana’s still small dependence on the RSA electric 
power may increase, given the cost and time-lag problem s o f  expanding domestic 
capacity.
The withdrawal o f  Portuguese personnel from  M ozam bique forced 
curtailment in rolling stock and maintenance and personnel support for 
Swaziland railways, which (after an unsuccessful attempt to use non-regional 
personnel) turned to South Africa for interim replacements. While the railway is 
itself becoming more autonom ous now, a new line links it m ore firm ly to the 
South African system.
Lesotho’s dependence has remained total. Its links increased quantitatively 
over the 1970s, with increased em ploym ent in South Africa supporting more 
private and public consum ption in Lesotho. But, since 1975-1976, mine and 
probably total Basotho em ploym ent in the Republic has declined, a trend likely 
to continue, but not one reducing dependence in the absence o f  dom estic 
alternatives.
Rhodesia has moved toward much greater dependence on South A frica in 
respect to trade, finance and transport. Som e, but perhaps not all, o f  this shift 
could be fairly readily and rapidly reversed by a genuinely independent 
Zimbabwe.
The most striking developm ent during 1977-1979 was Zam bia’s massive 
increase in dependency on the RSA. Part related to the econom ic crisis resulting
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from the collapse o f  copper prices and the varied econom ic costs o f  applyir. ; 
sanctions and confronting the Rhodesian UDI. Part flow ed from  the limited and 
deteriorating capacity o f  the Zambian internal transport system and part was 
associated with the 1978-1979 drought and dom estic grain availability crisi 
However, most resulted from the systematic destruction o f  its non-South African 
transport links through Angola (1975  — by the South African backed UNIT A), 
Tanzania (1979  — by Rhodesian armed forces), and M ozam bique (1979  — by 
the Rhodesian military). This left Zambia with effective rail (or road) access to 
the outside world only through South Africa (via Rhodesia). While the road and 
rail links to Tanzania were restored to partial utilisation within weeks, the need 
to use the RSA routes is unlikely to be ended until after genuine independence 
in Zimbabwe.
Regional initiatives have been, in large part, oriented toward dependence 
reduction. The Southern African Developm ent Co-ordination Conference (called 
by the Front Line States in Arusha, July 1979) centred on reduction o f  
dependence on the RSA. Its first priority was transport. However, the 
articulation and im plementation o f its regional transport plan will necessarily 
require several years whilst, against this, the destruction o f  Zam bia’s external rail 
and road links to other Front Line States (and o f  Botswana’s tenuous road ferry 
link to Zambia) made the second half o f  1979 a period o f  rapidly increasing 
transport dependence on the Republic.
The United Nations E conom ic Commission for  Africa (UNECA) has 
undertaken preliminary studies on  transport and com m unications links. How 
relevant these are to meeting short-term needs, and how  closely attuned to 
actual priorities som e o f  them are (e.g. the Khartoum -Gaborone and Windhoek- 
Tripoli highways) to actual econom ic requirements or integration possibilities is 
much disputed within ECA and between som e analysts and decision-takers. As 
a result, little action has resulted to date in the Southern African region, 
although som e other proposals (e.g. the Mombasa-Lagos Trans-Africa highway) 
have been agreed, designed and brought to the im plementation phase.
4. T H E  IN IT IA L  IM P A C T  O F  S A N C T IO N S  15
The follow ing sketch o f  initial sanctions impact is made in terms o f  broad 
orders o f  magnitude. It estimates impact before  national, regional or 
international adjustment measures are effective. It assumes:
a) total sanctions against trade and financial transactions with the R SA ;
b) sanctions im posed in the early 1980s;
c) Zim babwe and Namibia genuinely independen:, but still in the'early stages o f  
disengagement from  the RSA;
d) Zimbabwean and Angolan rail systems operational, but not fully 
rehabilitated; ■
e) no South African military operation against the dom estic or regional 
transport links o f  Southern African states.
The most affected state would clearly be L esotho. If there were a total 
blockade, it would lack any alternative land transport links. Until 1982, it would 
also lack an airport capable o f  handling even moderate sized cargo planes. In 
addition, Lesotho would lack access to petroleum products and — except by 
violation o f  sanctions — it w ould be similarly placed in regard to  sources o f  fo o d  
required to meet its dom estic deficit (increased by returning migrant workers) or
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general import requirements. Because effective sanctions would, by definition, 
damage the South African econom y, many or most Basotho em ployees in the 
Republic would probably be sent home. In that event, foreign exchange for 
imports and revenue for the government would be reduced by 50-75 per cent. 
There is one caveat which ought to be set against this picture o f  initial 
disintegration and potential starvation. South Africa might fear that this type o f  
evolution in Lesotho would cause a social crisis spreading into Natal and the 
Orange Free State. Therefore, it might have an interest in maintaining some 
em ploym ent, food , petroleum and import supplies, but certainly not enough to 
avoid a very serious across-the-board crisis.
In the case o í  Botswana, severe problem s w ould arise in respect to transport 
and petroleum supply. These would be o f  crisis proportions if no shift to  the use 
o f  routes via, and to the procurem ent o f  petroleum supplies from  or through, 
Zim babwe had taken place prior to sanctions. Severe food  problem s — how 
immediately serious being dependent on grain reserves and whether any return 
to fo o d  purchases from  Zim babwe had taken place — w ould arise. Contraction in 
the em ploym ent o f  Botswana in the Republic w ould cause severe problem s, 
especially in regions such as Ngamiland — a source o f  large numbers o f  migrants 
and limited numbers o f  hom e region jobs. Transitional problem s w ould arise in 
respect to general im port sources, but the main problem  in respect to imports 
and to exports would be blockages in transport. Mining expansion w ould be 
hampered by a severance o f  financial links with the RSA and mining operations 
could be crippled, precipitated by the loss o f  South African personnel. The latter 
could be as serious as the loss o f  access to transport routes and to petroleum 
supply.
Swaziland could face an initial transport plus energy crisis in regard to 
petroleum and electricity supply. The former would depend on the degree to 
which the railroad had becom e self-sufficient in rolling stock and maintenance; 
the second would be related to the degree to which petroleum sources had been 
shifted from Durban to M aputo and additional hydro-electric capacity and/or a 
coal-fired electricity plant built to replace South African im ports over the period 
before  sanctions. F ood supply (depending on reserves) and em ploym ent losses 
(depending on pre-sanctions expansion o f  dom estic sectors in Swaziland and the 
loss o f  em ploym ent in the RSA) could have a m odest to m oderately severe 
initial impact. In respect o f  imports, transitional problem s w ould arise. For 
exports, the losses would tend to  be severe in respect o f  manufacturers (e.g. T V  
sets and fertiliser) but moderate to low  for other major products. The financial 
problems would be transitional if Swaziland’s external assets were then largely 
held outside the Republic. However, they could  be m ore severe if assets were 
largely denominated in Rand. The potential loss o f  South African personnel 
could result in massive damage to almost all directly productive sectors — 
including sugar, citrus and livestock as well as mining, forestry and 
manufacturing.
The initial impact on Zambia is harder to project. In respect o f  transport, it 
will depend heavily on the degree o f  rehabilitation achieved before sanctions o f  
the Zambian, Angolan, Zimbabwean and M ocambican rail systems. As o f  1980, 
the loss o f  South African transport links would cause a crisis; two years after 
genuine independence in Zim babwe and Namibia ( if  the latter paralleled a falling 
away o f  RSA support to UNITA, allowing a restoration o f  service on the 
Benguela railroad) the impact might be small. The fo o d  supply problem  would 
depend on the state o f  initial pre-sanctions reserves, on whether Z im babw e had
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again becom e the main supplier o f  Zambian deficits, and on the continued 
availability and enhanced m obility o f  maize surpluses in Tanzania and Kenya. 
The other critical area would be that o f  mining personnel -  notably possible 
losses o f  South Africans (especially if this follow s an earlier exodus o f  white 
Rhodesians). Such events could cause a loss o f  output leading to a possible 
generalised econom ic crisis.
Mozambique, would prftbably face a transport crisis but o f  rather a different 
kind to other econom ies. Maputo might be under-utilised follow ing the blocking 
o f  South African transit traffic, while the port o f  Boira and the road and rail 
routes to it could well be swamped by additional traffic from  Botswana, 
Zim babwe and Zambia. The loss o f  Cabora Bassa pow er sales would probably . 
affect the lenders to the project more than M ozam bique because, to date, most 
South African payments go to repay construction loans which have never been 
accepted as obligations by M ozam bique or any M ocam bican com pany. However, 
until a national grid is com plete, the M aputo (industrial) area would face severe 
electricity supply problems. Calls for new transport facilities and credit on 
transit traffic payments to assist landlocked econom ies w ould place a severe 
strain on M ozam bique’s external and dom estic finances.
The initial sanctions impact on  Zim babw e would probably be severe. How 
severe would depend on the extent o f  reduction achieved in post-UDI links with 
RSA, the size o f  the R S A ’ s investments in Zim babwe, the degree to which the 
transport system had been rehabilitated, and on how  much transit traffic from  
Botswana and Zambia m oved through Zim babwe prior to sanctions. If pre­
sanctions changes are relatively large, severe transport problem s (e.g. the loss o f  
South African routes and increased transit demand) are likely; if they are small, 
a full-scale crisis in transport is possible. As with Zambia, Botswana and 
Swaziland, the loss o f  certain South African personnel could  be damaging to the 
mining sector.
The impact o f  sanctions on a genuinely independent Namibia might be fairly 
small. That assessment assumes there w ould have been a long period o f  
independence to have allowed substitution for South African transport 
maintenance facilities, the securernent o f  control over Walvis Bay (or access to 
an alternative port by reconstruction, construction or transport routes to 
Southern Angola — a necessity even in the absence o f  sanctions), the reduction 
o f  dependence on the Republic for personnel and alternative coal and fo o d  
sources. Sanctions im mediately after independence could  create a crisis (or 
worsen an existing one) through increasing the rate o f  departure o f  high- and 
middle-level personnel, exacerbating problem s over the transfer o f  Walvis Bay 
and requiring very rapid transition policy  and perform ance affecting foo d , coal 
and petroleum product sources.
Tanzania would be affected by support requirements — in respect to 
investment in transport and the need to provide formal or de fa cto  credit on 
transport charges — for the directly affected states. Experience over 1965-1979 
suggests that transport congestion and th* financial costs w ould be serious. 
During that period, in excess o f  $ 1,000 million was spent on Zambian-related 
transport project investment, equipm ent ,nd maintenance; and up to  S 80 
million in arrears on transport charges and export payments had accrued.
Further, the problem s o f  clearing, forwarding and planning for Zambian cargo 
have proved acute for  Tanzania (as they hjve for  M ozam bique and the RSA 
when Zambia has used their ports and rail oads).
The impact on Angola  w ould be similar to  that on Tanzania. The absolute
orders o f  magnitude might, however, be somewhat lower, but Angola’s transport 
system has already been gravely damaged by the civil war and subsequent 
insurgency.
Malawi would face relatively secondary trade, finance and high-level 
personnel problems. T o  this should be added a rather severe em ploym ent loss 
with the repatriation o f  at least 20 ,000 miners and perhaps many other workers 
from  the RSA.
However, if sanctions are imposed before the genuine independence o f  
Zim babwe and Namibia, som e aspects o f  the initial impact on several Southern 
African states given above would be more severe. In this context, Rhodesia and 
Namibia would suffer severe problem s or crises, but that w ould presumptively be 
part o f  the goals o f  sanctions, not strictly a cost. Indeed, South African 
intervention in Zim babwe or continued refusal to agree to any plausible proposal 
for free and fair elections in Namibia might, in this scenario, be the likely 
“ cause”  o f  the sanctions. In this scenario, a number o f  points deserve m ention at 
a country level.
L esotho's  situation w ould not be altered. Botswana w ould, however, face 
generalised crises because o f  the absence o f  any usable land transport route with 
the potential exception  o f  the Kazungulu Ferry to Zambia, the usability and 
usefulness o f  which must be in grave doubt under conditions o f  continued war in 
both Rhodesia and Namibia. Botswana’s access to petroleum and fo o d  supplies 
and its ability to ship exports would be near nil. Swaziland's position might be 
marginally worsened, but probably not much m ore than that. The question 
would turn on the continued functioning o f  the M ocambican transport sub­
system, centred on  M aputo. Zambia w ould face a generalised crisis. It would 
probably have very limited access to land transport because o f  continued damage 
to  routes, this leading to an accentuated inability to  export and a diminished 
access to vital fo o d  imports. The impact on M ozam bique w ould be m ore severe. 
Both damage to transport routes and pressures to provide new links (e.g. 
highway or indirect rail) to  serve Zambia w ould contribute to that outcom e. 
Further, the loss o f  South African transit traffic revenue would not be offset by 
alternative traffic to any significant extent. Tanzania w ould face greater 
pressures to provide transit services, but probably less traffic w ould actually 
reach her border with Zambia. Thus, the costs o f  seeking to  upgrade or expand 
capacity on present routes w ould be higher, but the strain on facilities might be 
lower. Angola  would be m ore severely affected in this scenario. However, this 
results from  an assumption about continuation o f  South African backed 
insurgency (blocking the L obito  Bay line) rather than o f  sanctions as such. The 
impact on Malawi would be unchanged.
5. R E G IO N A L  A N D  N A T I O N A L  A D J U S T M E N T S  T O  S A N C T IO N S
This review o f  potential adjustments seeks to  concentrate on steps possible 
within a maximum o f  eighteen m onths at costs either sustainable nationally or 
with conceivable levels o f  international support (see also section 6). It does not 
purport to  outline a draft Five-Year Regional Developm ent Plan (desirable, 
potentially practicable, but not squarely related to the situation pertaining 
immediately after the im position o f  sanctions). Nor does it seek to  consider 
what could be done were unlimited personnel, equipm ent, construction  capacity, 
foreign exchange and finance available (an unreal scenario).
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5.1 Regional A spects
Any adjustment programme which is to be reasonably effective in reducing 
costs and overcom ing barriers must have a significant regional com ponent. This 
fact is underlined both by the partial successes and substantial failures o f  
attempts to surmount the econom ic and physical impact o f  UDI and later 
Rhodesian sanctions on Zambia and Botswana. It is based on prevailing geo­
politics as well as the existing (and medium-term future) patterns affecting 
transport, petroleum refining and the fo o d  balance found in the Southern 
African region. It is not predicated on any generalised ideal o f  regionalism nor 
any illusion that co -ord in ated  action is simple, con flict free or uniform ly 
effective. The areas in which regional aspects are central include transport and 
com m unication, petroleum and food . In trade, regional co-ordination might also 
be o f  som e sign ificance.16
Transport
To be successful, transport adjustment w ould depend upon co-ordinated 
action to move the maximum feasible volum e o f  traffic to, from  and through the 
ports o f  Tanzania, Angola and M ozam bique. “ Maximum feasible”  in this context 
implies rationing, i.e. quotas by route and country with each state deciding 
which existing imports and/or exports to  continue and which to cut or reduce in 
order to fit available capacity. It also implies identifying those repairs, additions 
and link routes (feasible in the short to medium term) which could raise capacity 
and speed (as well as, if possible, lower unit costs). This might result from  
national or bilateral action in the spheres o f  construction, purchases and 
maintenance.
In tw o cases — Zambia and Zim babw e — rehabilitation o f  dom estic routes is 
the most critical priority. W ithout that, it would be Impossible to support 
Zambia whatever efforts the coastal states make; and it w ould be equally 
impossible to re-route Zimbabwean access lines or ship Zam bia’s and Botswana’s 
goods via Zimbabwe.
The main sub-areas to be considered within the transport sector include:
a) Ports:
Possible adjustments include m ore effective use o f  basic facilities and the 
upgrading o f  ancillary equipm ent and warehousing at Dar-es-Saiaam, Beira, 
M aputo, L obito Bay, possibly Mtwara and Tanga (the latter to free capacity at 
Dar-es-Salaam) and — in the event o f  access problem s at Walvis Bay — M ocamedes 
and Puerto Alexandre. In the case o f  barriers to the use o f  Walvis Bay, recreation 
o f  the port o f  Swakopm und may be required.
b) Railways
Priority adjustments here cover rehabilitation o f  the Zambian and 
Zimbabwean main lines, the L obito  Bay line, the Tanzanian portion o f  Tazara 
and the Beira line; increases to rolling stock and traction power in Zambia, 
Swaziland, M ozam bique, Angola, Botswana, (and to a lesser degree Tazara); a 
strengthening o f  management and maintenance capacities with special reference 
to Zambia, Zim babwe, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland; the planning and 
enforcem ent o f  a m ore rapid turnaround o f rolling stock, both by avoiding 
surges o f  traffic and by draconian penalties for using wagons as w-arehouses. 
Possible short to medium term additions include potential linkages o f  the 
Zambian system via Malawi to northern M ozam bique ports and (m ore
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doubtfully- because o f  the time factor,) direct linkage o f  Zambia Railways to the 
L obito Bay line, thereby bypassing Zaire.
c) Highways and Road Haulage
Possible capacity enhancing actions here might include the rehabilitation o f  
existing arterial routes; the filling o f  gaps o f  200 kilometres or less — e.g. with 
respect to the Zambia side o f  the arterial route to Beira and a heavy duty Katima 
Mulilo-Livingstone highway (if  Walvis Bay access is a problem , certain south 
Angolan routes w ould also fall into the category); the upgrading o f  longer 
stretches o f  low-grade roads — e.g. Western Botswana to Windhoek — for the 
absorption o f  secondary flows; the restoration o f  and expansion in heavy duty 
lorry fleets and maintenance capacities probably on a route-by-route single 
com pany basis (with a basic com pany fleet and maintenance depots plus 
contract vehicles), analogous to Zambia-Tanzania Road Services which, despite 
its limitations, m oved very substantial quantities o f  cargo relatively prom ptly 
and at much lower costs than the on ly actual alternative, viz. by air. However, 
with Zim babwe and Namibia genuinely independent, road transport should be 
distinctly secondary to, and would probably feed into, the rail system.
d) A ir
As a main transport m ode, air is hopelessly high cost and also beyond the 
operational capacity o f  the states or region (even assuming they could  procure 
sufficient equipment and crews). Experience in the late 1960s with the 
emergency oil lift to Zambia and with experiments at flying copper from  Zambia 
to Dar-es-Salaam demonstrated both these limitations. However, no matter how 
well co-ordinated, any emergency transport network will have bottlenecks and 
delays. Therefore, as an essential backup measure to break bottlenecks (e.g. in 
the case o f  critical spare parts, pharmaceuticals or lubricants) an air freight 
capacity w ould be necessary. At this level — say a half dozen Hercules — the 
airport facilities exist and a contract formulated on a regional basis, with an air 
freight operator, should be feasible. The Lesotho case is, however, rather special 
— the equipment, logistics and cost requirements o f  a full-scale operation for this 
country would be such that it w ould be only possible to m ount it 
internationally.
Co-ordination o f  the transport sector as a whole w ould optim ally take the 
form  o f  joint inter-state identification o f  needed flow s, route capacities and 
bottlenecks. This would provide the basis for traffic allocations, physical 
maintenance, expansion programmes, construction com m itm ents and the 
necessary institutional framework. M ost actual operations w ould, in the end, be 
national in character, or possibly bilateral within the agreed frame. Procedures 
and com m unications in respect to docum entation, the phasing o f  transport 
flows, the location o f  traction pow er, ar.d so on , w ould potentially be as 
important as issues related to physical capacity and availability o f  personnel. The 
successive snarls experienced with previous Zambian shipments via Tanzania, 
M ozam bique, Botswana and the Republic o f  South Africa bear witness in part to 
the regional implications o f  the deterioration o f  Zam bia’s dom estic transport 
capacity, but also to the near total failure (despite serious efforts) to develop 
clear, expeditious and mutually agreed procedures for  the com m unication  o f  
decisions and their implications. The issue here is not one o f  assigning “ blame” , 
but rather one o f  identifying a major constraint which, especially in the context 




' The refinery capacities o f  M aputo, Ndola, Luanda, Dar-es-Salaam and Umtali 
are probably adequate to meeL regional needs, particularly if they are improved 
by secondary inflows o f  refined products to Namibia as well as movements to 
and through Angola, M ozam bique and Tanzania. However, to verify this, and in 
order to identify workable crude and product im port programmes, refinery use 
patterns and petroleum flow s by country would need to be specified by a 
properly mounted technical co-ordination  and planning exercise.
The measures required to be implemented, to serve needs where they exist, is 
largely a question o f  transport. With Namibia and Zim babwe genuinely 
independent, this would appear manageable. Swaziland and Malawi could  be 
served from  Maputo, Namibia by imports from independent African or Middle 
Eastern refineries and Botswana from  Umtali. Tanzania, M ozam bique, Zambia, 
Angola and Zim babwe could depend basically on their ow n refineries with 
supplementary im ports channelled via ports in M ozam bique, Angola and 
Tanzania. Only Lesotho w ould be cut o f f  from  supplies. T o  increase crude and 
product imports very rapidly would probably require ancillary contingency 
arrangements with OPEC or with several OPEC members, e.g. Nigeria, Algeria 
and Iraq. (See further discussions in section 6.)
The establishment o f  any new distribution pattern will require time to com e 
into operation. Therefore, reserve stocks o f  60-90 days in Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland (and perhaps Malawi) plus som e reserves located at refineries for 
interim dispatch w ould be needed prior to sanctions. In addition, with 
independence in Zim babwe, recommissioning o f  the Umtali refinery7 and 
pipeline becom es a matter o f  urgency (but presumably this would be so 
independent o f  sanctions).
F ood
A self-contained regional fo o d  security system is not at this stage really 
practicable.17 Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia have experienced large 
and growing food  deficits. M ozam bique and Angola have had, and still have, 
post-independence transitional deficits. T o  posit surpluses for these countries in 
the early 1980s would therefore be unwise. Zam bia’s record is totally erratic. 
While Tanzania now appears to have a normal maize surplus, its size is much 
conditioned by weather and is in any event perhaps 150,000 — 200 ,000  tor.s-a 
year versus requirements o f  the order o f  300,000 tons in norma! and over
500,000 tons in drought years. A regional projection  o f  basic fo o d  balances 
(maize, wheat, sugar, vegetable oil, sugar and milk) is required to identify 
probable im port requirements and potential regional sources. Only in sugar is.the 
overall balance positive, and sugar imports derived from outside the region are 
relatively simply acquired as com pared to grains. However, some limited intra­
state trade flow s are possible and, where so, ought to be fed into the process o f  
transport co-ordination.
Zimbabwean independence could, o f  course, alter the overall fo o d  balance 
picture. However, given the damage to the farming sector during the past few 
years, and the uncertainty surrounding rural transition, large surpluses in 
Zim babwe are highly speculative.
An ongoing exchange o f  data on national reserve programmes and stocks (in 
one form  or another in progress in a m ajority o f  states and deserving higher 
priority in most, even apart from  sanctions) cou ld  provide a ground work for
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emergency (drought or flood  as well as sanctions) loan or sale transactions. This 
mechanism could provide a bridging period until the deficit state secured 
external supplies. There is som e recent history o f  such bilateral actions o f  this 
sort, e.g. on an ad h oc  basis between Tanzania/Zambia (in both directions) and 
Tanzania/Mozambique.
In order to be a bridge towards a new flow , not just the cause o f  a later gap 
(whether in the initial recipient state, the interim exporter or both ), regional 
food  security co-ordination needs to be linked to the global food  security 
programmes and policies o f  the World F ood  Council and World F ood  
Programme (see section 6).
Trade
Only limited regional adjustments in respect to im port sources and export 
markets are practicable or can be envisaged in the short or medium term. For 
instance, Swaziland cannot redirect output o f  its T V  sets, other electrical 
products and fertiliser from the RSA to Angola and Tanzania; Botswana cannot 
purchase mining machinery from  Malawi instead o f  RSA. However, som e 
potential market and source o f  supply alternatives do exist: e.g. som e o f  
Swaziland’s electrical goods and fertiliser might be sold to Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Zambia, Namibia and Zim babwe may have the capacity to produce 
certain mining spares and chemicals needed by Botswana. M ocam bican coal, 
shipped via Walvis Bay, might be a practicable replacement fo r  South African 
coal in Namibia.
The requirements appear to  be threefold: firstly a systematic inventory o f  
key import requirements and export capacities; secondly, a clearing house to 
make these data widely known to state and/or non-RSA private trading 
corporations as well as governments and their purchasing agencies; thirdly, 
established bilateral contracts — probably in a state-to-state framework like the 
M ozam bique/Tanzania annual trade agreements — executed by the trading 
companies. Like the other regional co-ordination proposals, this one is desirable, 
even in the absence o f  sanctions. However, like others, it w ould be m ore urgent 
and have different detailed priorities under conditions o f  sanctions being applied 
to South Africa.
5.2 Regional Mechanisms
If implemented, the Southern African Developm ent Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC) approach could provide a basis for  the transport and fo o d  security 
aspects as well as probably for  trade issues arising from  sanctions.18 It would 
function on the basis o f  regional exchange o f  data, leading to adjustment and 
co-ordination o f  national actions, plus the developm ent o f  project specific units 
and other joint activities. Presumably, it could  fairly easily encom pass petroleum 
supply problem s as well. The question arising is how fast and how  firm ly the 
SADCC plans could m ove into operation and whether they w ould involve more 
than the mere core o f  designated Front Line States. The SADCC’s approach 
would not per se focus on sanctions. Its perspective is the longer term reduction 
in dependence for developm ent, but this approach could  both reduce the cost o f  
sanctions to the extent that programmes have already begun and it w ould create 
a framework suitable for adopting measures directed to achieving regional 
adjustments to sanctions. The Econom ic Com mission for  Africa has proposed a 
number o f  regional initiatives. A  co-ordinated planning and p o licy  programme
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(MULPOC) has been established, based on its Lusaka sub-regional office. 
Similarly, a draft Preferential Trade Area — covering both tariff and non-tariff 
topics — has been negotiated by the Eastern and Southern African states.19 
However, Angola, M ozam bique and Tanzania still have major reservations about 
the Preferential Trade Area approach, while Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho 
cannot, in fact, apply it unless and until they are able (or forced , e.g. by 
sanctions) to withdraw from the South African Customs Union (SACU).
5.3 National E con om ic Policy  Adjustm ents
The outline o f  possible national actions given here is based on the assumption 
that regional co-ordination — including its com ponents o f  national action — does, 
in fact, take place on the general m ode! outlined above.
L esoth o , largely outside the scope o f  effective regional action, with very 
limited dom estic capacities to adjust, facing the loss o f  most or much o f  its 
monetary Gross D om estic Product (wage earnings remitted from South Africa, 
statutory Customs Union payments, and receipts from  South African tourism), 
has few independent possibilities for effective and total adjustment. Barring a 
massive international support programme (see section 6), Lesotho cou ld  not 
realistically be expected to participate in sanctions.
Botswana could reroute its transport flow s via Zim babwe (and perhaps 
peripherally through Zambia and Namibia). In that event, petroleum prodrcts 
could be secured from  or through Maputo and fo o d  from or through Zim babwe. 
This would allow most exports to flow  and make possible the procurem ent o f  
replacements for imports now secured from  the RSA, subject — that is — to the 
creation o f  a Botswana-based (public, private or m ixed) capacity. The 
replacement o f  South African finance could  be negotiated (with a time lag}. The 
most intractable short-term problem s might be related to replacing South 
African personnel (especially in mining and transport) and road haulage vehicles. 
The time required for adjustment implies the need for at least 60-90 days o f  
grain and fuel stocks at the time when sanctions are imposed. Massive 
unem ploym ent resulting from  returning migrant and contract workers now in 
South Africa could  be tackled by intensified rural developm ent, including age 
jobs in seasonal or year-round infrastructural projects in the areas o f  origin. This 
would mitigate, but not overcom e, the impact and w ould probably be possible 
on ly if programmes were well in hand on a stand-by basis prior to the im position 
o f  sanctions.
Swaziland could shift its transport, petroleum products and food  routing (not 
sources) away from  the RSA to M aputo. Indeed, a prima facie case for  beginning 
that process in respect to petroleum  and transport exists, irrespective o f  
sanctions. Its manufactured goods export problem , however, can at m ost be 
marginally alleviated by new regional markets. Yet, broader Indian Ocean or 
African prospects are problem atic, albeit worth' exploring. Procurement problem s 
for im ports and recruitment problem s for peponnel are likely to be more serious 
for Swaziland than Botswana, especially in respect o f  transport. Electricity 
supply could  be maintained w ithout rationing and cuts (at least 1 /3  o f  total, 50 
per cent o f  central grid deliveries as o f  1980 and more each year thereafter) only 
if new hyrdo-electric and/or coal-fired capacity is com pleted by the time o f  
sanctions or the establishment o f  a bilateral link to M ozam bique (dependent 
here on  linking Cabora Bassa to M aputo). A  60 - 90 day grain stock and similar 
length o f  oil pipeline before sanctions are also needed. A  serious unem ploym ent
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problem from  returned migrants and curtailed export sectors — on  the order o f
20,000 em ployees — could  be alleviated by use o f  semi-skilled personnel to 
replace som e South Africans and by an enhanced infrastructural programme. But 
these measures could hardly be expected to cope with the full impact and 
numbers involved.
Zam bia’s national requirements centre on effective organisation, maintenance 
and rehabilitation o f  dom estic transport capacity, and on recruitment to replace 
South African personnel in mining. If these could  be achieved, the external 
aspects o f  the transport, fuel, im port-export and food  sectors would begin to  fall 
into place, assuming, that is, som e success in regional co-ordination. The 
apparently limited nature o f  these requirements is misleading. Zambia is 
apparently very debilitated by fourteen years o f  coping with UDI (including the 
impact o f  ineffective global sanctions against Rhodesia, which arguably hurt 
Zambia somewhat m ore than they did Rhodesia) and by five years o f  collapsed 
copper prices over 1975-1979. Even maintenance o f  the present level o f  e ffort is 
proving a nearly unbearable strain. Genuine independence in Zim babwe, if 
accompanied by continued m oderate to buoyant copper prices, w ould provide 
consolidation and breathing space, thereby allowing for physical and perhaps 
econom ic rehabilitation. But how  much this w ould help is not predictable, 
especially given the uncertainties as to future events in Z im babwe or any date 
for sanctions imposition.
M ozam bique  is under even greater strain than Zambia physically, in terms o f  
personnel requirements and econom ic needs. Its major dom estic adjustment 
requirements w ould turn on mobilising local transport and refinery capacity and 
on rural developm ent to cope with up to possibly 75 ,000  returning workers 
(available figures are not wholly reliable). If personnel, equipm ent and finance 
could be secured (this being largely an international support issue — as 
M ozam bique has no national spare capacity), then the first two adjustments 
would appear feasible. The third turns on  how fast the already initiated 
agricultural and broader rural developm ent strategy for the Southern Provinces 
can be articulated and implemented both before and after sanctions.
Zim babwe's adjustment needs are, in fact, basically those any genuinely 
independent state would pursue, but over a considerably com pressed period o f  
time. Again, they focus on dom estic transport problem s and skills recruitment 
(from  returning Zimbabweans and others) needed to replace prospective 
departing South Africans and also white Rhodesians. The degree and pace o f  
progress before sanctions Would be critical to what might be achieved after, but 
is quite incalculable at present.
Xamibia's situation is com parable to Z im babw e’s, but more self-contained in 
that Namibia is not a main alternative transit route for other landlocked states. 
(Unless one assumes a post-1986 date for  sanctions, the Trans-Kalahari network 
would not be in service.) Namibia’s problem s might be marginally m ore 
manageable if Walvis Bay were settled and in Namibian hands. But if it is not — 
with or without sanctions — major, and at best expensive and uncertain, 
construction o f  a temporary port at Swakopm und will be required, together 
with new road links in southern Angola and either the construction  o f  facilities 
at Puerto Alexandre or expansion o f  those at M ocamedes.
Tanzania, like Zambia and M ozam bique, is in a state o f  extrem e physical and 
econom ic fatigue from UDI, post-1974 new international econ om ic disorder as 
well as from  the Ugandan invasion, subsequent support for  Ugandan liberation 
and flood  damage in 1979. Its personnel and organisational capacities are greater
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than many other states, but are at (or beyond) sustainable stress. Transport 
•rehabilitation — the key Tanzanian input to any effective regional e ffort — is 
presently a national prioriiy. How far it might proceed before (and how rapidly 
remaining gaps could be filled after) sanctions application w ould depend on the 
speed and nature o f  international co-operation  vis-a-vis Tanzania’s current crisis, 
and at least as much again on co-operation  after the im position o f  sanctions.
Angola is an additional case for which the most critical contribution  to 
regional adjustment w ould be transport for Zambia, perhaps for Botswana via 
Zambia and for Zaire (a substantial portion o f  the trade o f  which now  traverses 
Zambia and Rhodesia on its way to South African ports). Again, transport is a 
national goal, independent o f  sanctions. How far it could be attained would 
depend on external co-operation  (partly in hand) and on a cessation o f  South 
African backed UNITA insurrection (which presumptively would be m ore 
feasible after genuine independence in Namibia). Reconstruction o f  the L obito  
Bay line as a dependable, heavy duty route w ould probably require at least 
eighteen m onths’ work in conditions not marked by recurrent sabotage.
Malawi's adjustment in respect to fuel, fo o d  and trade w ould appear to be 
within the capacity o f  a fairly routine state and com pany action if regional 
co-ordination on transport, petroleum and fo o d  was even moderately effective. 
The personnel recruitment adjustment would probably also be soluble through 
normal channels. The immediate em ploym ent o f  returning migrants would, 
however, not be possible. M oreover, present rural developm ent strategies w ould 
probably not afford attractive opportunities for any substantial numbers.
5.4 Zim babwe and Namibia: Special Considerations
In a scenario in which Zim babwe and/or Namibia were not fully independent, 
far fewer and less effective adjustments w ould be possible. This w ould arise 
because o f  the follow ing considerations: Zim babwean routes to M ozam bique 
would not be open to Zambia and Botswana; Botswana’s exiguous land link to  
Zambia at Kazungulu Terry would be at best risky and uncertain as a main 
route; Botswana’s fuel needs could  not be supplied from  Umtali (nor given the 
Kazungulu problem w ould supplies from  Ndola be safe or dependable); Angola 
would probably not have before-it the prospect o f  rehabilitating the L obito  Bay 
line; Zambia would almost certainly not have been able to rehabilitate its 
dom estic transport system; and the exhaustion o f  confronting non-independence 
in these states would be even greater in respect o f  Zambia, M ozam bique, Angola 
and Tanzania than in the past.
The broad patterns o f  regional and national adjustment w ould, however, need 
to be the same, viz. excising the unavailable routes and the tw o dependent 
territories; However, the results w'ould be systematically poorer, especially in 
respect to  the ability o f  Tanzania and M ozam bique to  mobilise adequate 
transport capacity and the ability o f  Zambia and Botswana to maintain adequate 
access to the outside world. Specific projects w ould be needed to avert 
Botswana’s virtual isolation (paralleling L esotho’s) and Zam bia’s transport 
problem s which, if exacerbated, could trigger a general collapse o f  the econ om y  
and polity. In order to  cop e  with these problem s, the follow ing  proposals w ould 
need consideration: a massive international support fo r  the rapid bolstering o f  
Tazara, including maintenance workshops, rolling stock , traction pow er and 
engineering personnel; a parallel initiative in respect to the L ob ito  Bay line, plus 
an international deterrent to  protect it (see section 6 ); a similar (albeit smaller)
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exercise to create either a much larger ferry or p on toon  bridge capacity at 
Ka/ungulu, plus an international deterrent force to protect it (again, see section
6); personnel, equipm ent, finance and construction capability to bring the whole 
o f  the Lusaka-Beira and Lusaka-Maputo road routes up to a heavy lorry standard 
and to keep them there, plus a fleet o f  at least 500 heavy duty lorries, and 
engineering staff, plus equipm ent for tw o main and tw o subsidiary maintenance 
depots; an air cargo capacity specifically oriented to Botswana’s requirements 
and a larger general regional air freight fleet (perhaps a minimum o f  12 Hercules 
shuttling from  M aputo and/or Dar-es-Salaam to connect with sea cargo as well as 
an additional shuttle service from  Ndola or Lusaka connecting with external air 
freight services).
The central alternatives here are in respect to transport. The other 
adjustments required or possible are m odified on ly to the extent they depend on 
transport. However, for Botswana and Zambia, the transport (and consequential) 
differences would be colossal.
6. P O T E N T IA L  IN T E R N A T IO N A L  C O N T R IB U T IO N S  T O  
S A N C T IO N S  A D J U S T M E N T
The automatic answer to what might be the international contribution  to  
minimizing the potentially damaging impact from , and providing supportive 
positive adjustments after, sanctions is finance: but this is far too  simple an 
answer.
Experience with the impact o f  sanctions against Rhodesia or Southern 
African states, and with the relative failure o f  international responses to requests 
by these states for assistance, suggests several things.
Firstly, support for states negatively affected by sanctions should be planned 
and implemented parallel to sanctions enforcem ent. Prompt damage limitation 
and prevention is likely to be m ore effective than a delayed assessment o f  and 
on ly partial com pensation for losses already borne.
Secondly, broad financial damage assessments do not in themselves produce 
adequate pledges, let alone adequate financial transfers, to  m eet the need even in 
purely financial terms.
Thirdly, many requirem ents are quite specific  and either cannot be met at all 
or cannot be met effec tiv ely  by financial transfers alone. For exam ple, in the 
absence o f  a workable transport and petroleum  products supply programme, no 
amount o f  funding could  sustain external trade and dom estic econ om ic  activity. 
Finance to offset losses from  mine closures forced  by losses o f  South African 
personnel would be much less cost-effective and much less em ploym ent- 
supporting than the recruitment and supplying o f  replacement personnel.
At least eight areas for, or different types o f, international co-operation  to 
reduce the costs o f  sanctions and im prove adjustments by Southern African 
states can be identified. These include: the special case o f  Lesotho, fo o d , 
petroleum products, transport systems maintenance and rehabilitation, financial 
cost support (both  recurrent and capital), interim procurem ent and marketing 
services, replacement personnel, and security for independent Southern African 
transport systems. Consider each in turn.
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L esoth o  ;
The im pact o f  sanctions against the Republic o f  South Africa on Lesotho 
would be uniquely high and L esotho’s ability to  adjust through national and 
regional measures similarly low . Therefore, a quite special international support 
package would be appropriate. One com ponent could  be an airlift (and,if 
needed, a military construction team to build at least interim heavy duty airfield 
facilities). A second could  be in the field o f  finance for  a mass em ploym ent 
programme specifically designed for Lesotho (e.g. reforestation, minor roads, 
water control works, village com m unal buildings and rural housing) so as to 
prevent the loss o f  jobs in South Africa leading to a total collapse o f  Basotho 
household incom es. A third could  be the procurem ent and supply o f  critical 
goods and personnel to replace in part those previously secured from  South 
Africa.
F ood
Even in a normal year, South Africa exports substantial quantities o f  maize, 
wheat, vegetable oil, sugar and dairy products to other Southern African states.
In drought years, the grain flow  reaches the order o f  500,000 tons. Even in the 
absence o f  transport and com m unications problem s within the region, sudden 
attempts by the individual states to procure replacement supplies w ould face 
very real physical problem s and w ould be likely to have a marked e ffect on 
world grain prices. The replacement o f  South African supplies requires basically 
grain and transport, not merely financial transfers. One is faced, therefore, with 
a world fo o d  security type o f  question, which can and should be addressed in the 
context o f  the World F ood  Council and World F ood  Programme. Speedy access 
to emergency reserves and to the means to m ove them are central to  resolyir.g 
this sort o f  problem . A  parallel requirement — and one am ply justified by 
weather-induced changes in annual output as well as by the need to create a 
breathing space to adjust to sanctions — w ould be assistance in the construction 
o f  a 60-90 day national reserve warehousing capacity and in the establishment o f  
grain reserves in the independent Southern African countries. These — like 
longer-term regional production  enhancement programmes — w’ou ld  have long­
term, positive implications and would merit international support even in the 
absence o f  sanctions.
Petroleum  Products
The issues involved in respect o f  petroleum products are analogous to  those 
concerning food . Physical supplies delivered on time and not merely finance fo r  
purchases are crucial. True, im ports from  the R SA  are negligible in w orld terms 
(under 500 ,000  tons, If Zim babwe has by then reactivated its refinery and 
Namibia switched suppliers before sanctions,. Howrever, the “ spot market”  is 
both  narrow (thus not necessarily able to provide extensive supplies) and highly 
volatile in price (exploding upward on real or believed increases in calis made 
upon it). Therefore, an OPEC (or even an individual oil exporting state) 
programme to provide prom pt, alternative supplies and means to  ship them 
(preferably at standard contract prices) would be needed. It would be given 
m ore time to com e into e ffect if each o f  the 3L S states assisted in pushing to 




The strain on dom estic and regional routes o f  coping with traffic diverted 
from  the RSA system will undoubtedly be intense. The need to build or upgrade 
link roads will be urgent. (Major lines o f  transport, e.g. the Trans-Kalahari, 
cannot be seen as a form o f  short-term sanctions adjustment, since those 
activities take five to seven years to bring to com pletion  even after the basic 
route, design and standards are known.) Again, the o ffer  o f  finance to cover 
costs would not be a fully adequate response.
Trained personnel, to replace South Africans, to fill vacancies, to expand 
maintenance and construction capacity, and to train citizens w ould be a sine qua 
non for successful support. So, equally, will prom pt provision o f  additional road 
vehicles, rolling stock, traction pow er, track and machinery, maintenance 
equipm ent, spares for rolling stock, and ancillary facilities. So long as these are 
serviceable and com patible with existing systems, they need not be new. Indeed, 
the need to start the flow  within weeks o f  sanctions suggests the wisdom  o f  an 
interim use o f  serviceable, second-hand equipment. Again, a purely market- 
oriented approach to  procurem ent and recruitment w ould probably not work at 
least in the initial six months. Direct action by external co-operating states 
(especially those with state railways, highway haulage com panies and engineering 
corps) w ould be needed. The effectiveness o f  support to post-sanctions 
adjustment would depend to  a considerable extent on how  far pre-sanctions 
period co-operation  might have already contributed to the rehabilitation o f  the 
Zambian, Angolan, M ozam bican and (after genuine independence) Zimbabwean 
road and rail transport systems.
R ecruitm ent and P rocurem ent
The replacement o f  South African personnel (especially in transport and 
mining) and the location o f  alternative sources for imports previously secured 
from  the Republic are essential parts o f  any adjustment programme. Equally, 
they are activities which most Southern African states, public corporations or 
private firms will find difficult to nearly impossible w ithout external 
co-operation. All o f  the latter group lack the systems and channels to switch 
recruitment or procurem ent rapidly and on  a large scale. The most logical initial 
co-operating bodies w ould appear to be state procurem ent agencies, public 
corporations and recruitment and placem ent agencies or units. The range and 
volum e o f  their activities — even in basically market econom ies like the USA or 
Federal Germany — is such that a properly organised programme cou ld  relatively 
easily cope  with a substantial proportion  o f  procurem ent and recruitment needs 
arising from  Southern African states and units in their private sectors. 
Requirements in the private sector could  be partly found through secondm ents.
Finance
The likely stress expected in areas oth er  than finance proper should not imply 
that external co-operation inputs which w ould be needed in meeting the 
financial adjustment costs would not be essential. Immediate adjustment costs 
and the financing o f  emergency projects aimed at the reduction in dependence 
w ould be high — perhaps o f  a value o f  $ 250 m illion annually for  each item 
(?  500 million total) if the worst effects on the Southern African states and their 
peoples are to be substantially mitigated. That is a very rough figure, inclusive o f
24
the costs for specific support programmes sketched above. Apart from co; 
incurred on these programmes supplying specific goods, services or personnel, 
support to offset recurrent costs w ould most appropriately be in block  grants, 
certainly not in project-tied loans, with reimbursement in arrears. The latter 
form at w ould cause a minimum 12-month delay in disbursement, thereby- 
defeating the purpose o f  the exercise. Project support loans — preferably with 
expedited procedures for the stages o f  design, assessment, approval and dis­
bursement — are appropriate for fixed investment programmes and projects 
designed to have a short- or medium-term impact on prom oting regional or 
national alternatives to the use o f  South African goods or services. They are 
likely to be most effective if they can be made available to speed up 
implementation o f  projects designed, assessed and, perhaps even begun, prior to 
sanctions.
Transport Security
As recent experience in the region demonstrates, adjustment is virtually 
impossible to sustain in the face o f  the systematic destabilisation o f  transport 
routes and systems. The assurance o f  security from  external pressures o f  this sort 
would thus be a logical part o f  external econom ic co-operation  in support o f  the 
independent Southern African states.
The bulk o f  the damage to transport systems has been caused by ad h oc  
airborne operations. T o  ensure against their repetition in the event o f  sanctions 
against South Africa would require both an effective early warning (detection) 
system and an installed air defense (interceptor) capacity.
If these tw o com ponents were present, they w ould probably not need to  be 
used. The Republic w ould presumably not wish to clash with international forces 
capable o f  inflicting serious retaliatory damage on its military' units and cou ld  
hardly hope to secure removal o f  sanctions through confrontation  with such 
units. However, to have this deterrent effect, the unit w ould need “ teeth ’ — an r 
“ observer”  or “ interposition”  force  o f  the standard UN pattern w ould be 
unlikely to be effective. The equipm ent, personnel and cost requirements for 
such a unit need not be huge. As the posited purpose w ould be the defence o f  
key internal transport facilities and the chances o f  actual com bat w ould be low , 
such a transport security presence — e.g. through a UN operation — w ould  be an 
appropriate part o f  external econ om ic  support for the independent states and 
peoples o f  Southern Africa in the context o f  sanctions.
Timing Considerations
International support for  post-sanctions adjustment is unlikely to  be very 
speedy or effective if it is not in som e sense planned prior to the im position o f  
sanctions. On the other hand, an agreed international programme for mitigating 
the adverse impact o f  sanctions on Southern African states is unlikely' to be 
negotiable so 'long as key states oppose sanctions.
Certain preliminary steps may be practicable now, for example:
a) technical studies by voluntary bodies on the nature o f  possible national 
responses related to the character o f  needed international inputs: these could 
be carried out on  a country and sectoral basis;
b) the distribution o f  these studies to  Southern African states, international 
agencies and other states for  inform ation purposes, com m ent, and evaluative 
criticism;
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c) the development t)f informal dialogue — especially at a technical level — 
among Southern African states, international agencies and other states to 
create a mutual awareness o f  likely technical problem s, requirements, 
capacities and constraints;
d) the formulation o f  quasi-official contingency plans at a national, sectoral and 
technical level, which could be used for determining initial programmes as 
soon as sanctions might be im posed;
e) the consideration o f  the potential uses (and possible speed-up) o f  general 
dependence-reducing projects and programmes needed in the event o f  
sanctions;
f) support for programmes — e.g. L obito  Bay, Tazara, M ozam bique Railways, 
Kazungulu Ferry rehabilitation, petroleum and grain storage capacity and 
stock expansion — needed for general econom ic developm ent, but which 
w ould be particularly critical in the event o f  sanctions.
7. S A N C T IO N S  E X E M P T IO N S  A N D  L IM IT A T IO N S  O N  
C O V E R A G E
The main analytical basis to this report has been based on the twin 
assumptions o f  total sanctions (covering exports, im ports and finance) against 
South Africa which are applied by all states, including all those in Southern 
Africa. This section sketches the implications — for Southern African states — o f  
certain exem ptions or o f  less-inclusive sanctions coverage.
L esotho E xem pted
The exem ption o f  Lesotho would not have a major impact on the general 
effectiveness o f  sanctions. However, assuming sanctions were effective, it would 
only marginally assist Lesotho.
If sanctions were effective, the resulting econom ic decline in the Republic 
would cause a massive em ploym ent decline for Basotho in the R epublic and 
therefore an associated loss o f  purchasing pow er to Lesotho. Further, remaining 
Rand earnings would not be available for  use to buy im ports from  outside the 
RSA.
Whether the RSA would permit sealed, inspected transit shipments o f  goods 
it was unwilling or unable to sell to Lesotho after sanctions (e.g. petroleum 
products) is doubtful. To the extent that Lesotho could  pay, it could 
presumptively purchase food , som e general manufactured goods and electricity 
from South Africa.
Broader Exem ptions
If exem ptions were broadened to include several states, loopholes w ould be 
opened. The present South African interest in the contract refining o f  crude 
purchased by or for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland appears to  be at least in 
part an experiment with ways o f  increasing South African access to petroleum. 
Similarly, for South African transport routes to be permitted to  be used by 
Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland w ould lead to almost insuperable policing
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problem s related to the prevention o f  South African im ports and exports being 
disguised so as to slip in or out under the “ transit traffic”  umbrella.
An exem ption in respect to food  would, however, be practicable South 
Africa would presumably be eager to continue selling food  to Southern Alrican 
states. Policing, on the other hand, would be relatively easy. However, as 
payment would be required in a form usable by South Africa, a small but not 
negligible loophole would be opened (unless one assumed a totally effective 
naval blockade).
An exem ption related to the em ploym ent o f  migrant workers in South Africa 
would be o f  limited value. If sanctions were effective, South Africa would phase 
down their numbers rapidly. Further, unless linked to an exem ption in respect . 
to imports from South Africa, the remittance flow  would be halted or rendered 
ineffective.
The em ploym ent o f  South African nationals would, in itself, pose few 
problem s for  sanctions enforcem ent. However, to allow remittances by them 
would create a small, but not insignificant, loophole.
Less Than Total Sanclions
Any number o f  partial sanctions packages could be hypothesized. The only 
one which w ould appear to  have a substantial chance o f  success in forcing 
change by the Republic and be likely to be acceptable as well as enforceable in 
the absence o f  total sanctions w ould appear to  be a com bination  o f  petroleum 
and financial sanctions.
The oil-plus-financial sanctions option  would have distinctly lower costs for 
the independent Southern African states. However, the costs and adjustment 
requirements would remain substantial if  this sanctions package had a substantial 
impact on the RSA.
Substantial transport facilities — at a first approxim ation, virtually all rail and 
port capacity, but little in the spheres o f  roads or airways — w ould remain 
available. So would most imports now secured from  the Republic. South African 
personnel would also probably continue to be available. The petroleum  supply 
problem s would be unaltered. Financial Hows from  the RSA w ould tend to be 
negligible and em ploym ent in South Africa would be reduced sharply because o f  
the econom ic im pact o f  sanctions on the Republic.
A possible gain to the Southern African states from  this alternative is that the 
RSA w ould probably be less inclined to seek the destabilisation o f  their 
econom ies or disruption o f  their internal transport systems. Because it would 
have an interest in maintaining trade and transport with them, the costs o f  these 
forms o f  intervention to the Republic would be higher than under a total 
sanctions scenario.
Whether petroleum and finance sanctions would be effective is nonetheless a 
more difficult question. Once Saso! Ill (coai-to-oil) is com plete and molasses- 
based ethanol capacity significant, South Africa is likely to be far less dependent 
on im ported petroleum, even if present “ w et”  gas/condensate “ show s”  com e to 
nothing.20 M oreover, if gold prices sustain their recently high levels, it is unclear 
whether South Africa w ould continue to need major international com m ercial 
bank credits. These issues are relevant to the present report on ly in the sense 
that long, drawn out, relatively ineffectual sanctions against the R SA  w ould be 
likely to have a serious, meaium-term, debilitating e ffect on neighbouring 
econom ies long before they “ bit”  in the Republic.
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8. P O T E N T IA L  A D J U S T E D  P O S IT IO N S
In reviewing the potential adjusted position o f  different econom ies, it is 
assumed that national adjustment, regional co-ordination and international 
support have been roughly along the lines indicated in sections 5 and 7. It is also 
assumed that the measures have achieved moderate (but not total) effectiveness. 
It thus portrays a “ best probable”  scenario, not a prediction, a “ m ost likely”  or 
a “ worst probable”  outcom e.
On the positive and developm ent side, it is clear that the general lines o f  
adjustment to sanctions amount to the same as for reorienting o f  developm ent 
away from the present excessive dependence on the Republic o f  South Africa 
and toward greater national integration and regional co-ordination. In that sense, 
the response to sanctions would speed up a desirable set o f  actions and by 
forcibly increasing their priority the e ffect w ould be to increase national (and 
perhaps external) resource allocations to their attainment.
However, taken by itself, that is.a Panglossian reading. Most investment 
needed for adjustment would  be required over the next two decades even 
without sanctions. Reduction  o f  dependence on a much larger, stronger 
neighbour is desirable, even if it does not have the special, undesirable 
characteristics o f  the RSA. Creative response to pressures docs, however, focus 
attention in ways which may have positive long-term results. But the relative 
urgency, order and priority o f  individual programmes w ould be d ifferen t in 
character under a phased-disengagement as opposed to a sanctions-adjustment 
scenario. Moreover, Ihe bunching o f  requirem ents could create various almost 
insuperable obstacles (i.e. the constant danger o f  breakdowns) in som e sectors 
and for som e countries. Then, too , the costs o f  moving more rapidly both in 
terms o f  programmes undertaken and o f  those which must be postponed could 
be very high. Finally, many o f the transitional costs (e.g. those in the transport 
sphere, until adequate facilities and institutions are made operational, those 
affecting unem ployed returnees or marginalised migrants over an extended 
period, possibly production  losses incurred before replacement personnel are 
recruited, import premiums and export discounts experienced before new and 
orderly trade sources and outlets are built up) are simply not developm ental in 
nature, but are specific to a sanctions-adjustment scenario for disengagement.
It is also probably true to say that sanctions would force  a change in 
development strategy which w ould be lasting and positive — assuming for this 
purpose that sanctions did not collapse, but remained in force for at least three 
years and ended with change in the Republic o f  South Africa. But that is an 
offset ^gainst their very real costs — not necessarily, in itself, an argument for 
using sanctions as a means to bring about changes in internal developm ent 
strategy in and among the independent Southern African states.
Lesotho  would face massive costs which no plausible level o f  external support 
could offset, notably in the loss o f  well over half o f  Basotho cash incom e. 
Support programmes could, however, help transform the rural sector (despite 
the fact that the record o f  crash em ploym ent schemes has not been alluring).
But there is no way that Lesotho could becom e internally, econom ically  
integrated or acquire a normal trading principal other than South Africa. The 
development gains would, at best, help strengthen L esotho ’s position vis-a-vis a 
“ new”  South Africa afier  sanctions and w ould do so at a high interim cost.
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Bolswaua would face- fairly low costs if Zim babwe and Namibia were 
independent, the rail route lo  Boira were operational, and if the recruitment 
solutions implemented avoided serious production  losses occasioned by the 
departure o f  South Africans. It could , however, suffer disastrous losses if none 
o f  these conditions were met. In the first case, development gains resulting 
through the greater impetus to co-ordinated activity involving Namibia (e.g. 
Trans-Kalahari, which could also integrate Botswana physically and 
econom ically) and Zim babwe might actually outweigh costs. In the second, 
survival would be the only operative imperative and no co-ordination build-up 
with Namibia and Rhodesia w ould be possible.
Swaziland would probably face fairly moderate costs. However, it is unlikely 
that a medium-term adjustment programme would provide impetus for a 
coherent new developm ent strategy with the problem atic exceptions o f  fo o d  
production  and integrated water use planning.21
Zambia's additional costs might only be marginal if Namibia and Zim babwe 
were genuinely independent. However, any additional costs w ould most likely 
weaken, not reorient, developm ent in Zambia. If Zim babwe and Namibia were 
not genuinely independent, the costs would be higher, the negative impact on 
developm ent greater, and the risk o f  political-econom ic collapse very real.
M ozam bique would face costs primarily from  resource diversion needed to 
meet transport requirements and significantly greater unem ploym ent in its 
southern provinces if and when migrants returned. These w ould also be costs 
related to the quicker implementation o f  objectives — refashioned transport 
links and the return o f workers are already desired and planned, but over a 
longer time frame. The basic constraints here w ould be in the realm o f  
organisational capacities and personnel shortages — constraints which w ould 
probably limit the possible developm ent gains.
Zim babwe and Namibia, if genuinely independent, w ould basically face a ' 
speeding up o f  an ongoing process as result o f  sanctions. In the early 1980's, 
they would presumably begin disengaging from  South Africa at the maximum 
rate they perceived as prudent and/or possible. The short-term costs — in terms 
o f  breakdowns o f  key production  and service units, institutions and sectors — o f  
acceleration o f  these objectives might be ven,- high. If major external support 
were available, it is arguable that these costs could  be lowered and that the total 
cost o f  transition to a new developm ent strategy would be lower on the abrupt 
than on the longer “ prudent”  trajectory.
Tanzania's costs w ould be analogous to M ozam bique’s. However, the 
country ’s greater personnel and institutional capacity might allow it a greater use 
o f  adjustment measures to further current national integration and regional 
co-ordination strategies.
Angola  might experience rather limited costs from  adjustment to sanctions. 
L obito Bay line rehabilitation would, if feasible at all, have a high external 
com ponent and be urgently needed even without sanctions. On the other hand, 
the need for dom estic reconstruction after the 1961-74 war o f  liberation and the 
continuing civil hostilities w ould be so massive and pressing that there would 
probably not be enough resources to devote to the new developm ent initiatives 
(national or regional) made possible in the context o f  general sanctions 
adjustments.
Malawi under present management, would face only m odest generalised costs. 
Returning Malawian workers and their households, however, would face very' 
severe costs. The externally oriented development strategy w ould be slowed
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(with the “ loss”  o f  the RSA com ponent), but it w ould probably not be altered. 
The real question here might be whether the differential impact o f  sanctions and 
the altered regional context w ould lead — in one way or another — to a “ change 
in management”  in Malawi.
Im pact on South Africa
Sanctions im position by the independent Southern African states would most 
likely not, by itself, be the dom inant e ffect o f  sanctions on the Republic. The 
direct impact, however, would not be negligible. A fairly high percentage o f  
non-gold exports go to other Southern African states. Sales o f  services (e.g. 
transport, insurance, finance and construction) plus remittances from  them in 
the form o f interest, profits. South African expatriates savings or hom e 
expenses form a rather larger share o f  South A frica ’s “ invisible”  earnings. Thus, 
sanctions by the regional states w ould certainly cause damage to  the South 
African econom y.
In any event, independent Southern African states could  not (even if all 
wished to do so or an effective global sanctions programme excluding them were 
a credible option) avoid much o f  the impact o f  sanctions by refraining from  
imposing them themselves. The bulk o f  the initial impact and final cost would 
result from  what sanctions in general might do to  South Africa and the latter’s 
probable attempts to  adjust. This would be quite apart from  direct reactions 
against what the independent Southern African states might do.
9. C O N C L U S IO N
The specification o f  the initial impact, adjustment requirements and “ final”  
cost burden implied by sanctions against the Republic o f  South Africa on and 
for the independent Southern African states is not to op pose sanctions. This is 
an important point to bear in mind. At least five o f  the states (presumptively 
seven on the genuine independence o f  Z im babwe and Namibia) are themselves 
strong proponents o f  sanctions. This sketch — and more detailed follow -up 
studies which are needed — fo llow  quite different logical imperatives. These are 
fundamentally tw ofold : firstly, the point that realistic assessment is needed to 
identify costs, problem s and possibilities; and, secondly, an understanding o f  the 
parameters o f  the initial impact and potential adjustments is necessary to plan 
ahead domestically, to prepare for co-ordinated action regionally in order to 
mobilise external support for sanctions policies.
However, the sketch suggests a com pelling case against any repetition o f  the 
Rhodesian sanctions experience. A com bination  o f  a largely ineffectual sanctions 
policy — applied by all or several Southern African states, but grossly evaded by 
many other states and by firms based in them — which might be late, limited and 
not underpinned with adequate international support for  affected Southern 
African states is a scenario for disaster. The independent Southern African states 
and peoples in themselves are in no position to bear the cost o f  fifteen years o f  
that type o f  confrontation  with the Republic o f  South Africa. The exact 
parameters o f  disintegration, collapse and chaos cannot be sketched any more 
easily than the nature o f  the necessarily brutal survival strategies which might 
fo llow  without sanctions. Nevertheless, it can be said that the general prospects 
o f  the latter, however vaguely illuminated, are potentially appalling.
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It must also be noted at once that the absence o f  sanctions is no better 
solution. It w ould at most m ove the disaster a few  years toward cr just beyond 
2000. A scenario o f  repression begetting violence in an ascending spiral within 
the Republic o f  South Africa w ould inevitably draw the independent Southern 
African states into a catastrophe. Support for liberation movements and raids 
against their bases and against the econom ic and transport infrastructure o f  their 
hosts would fo llow  the bitter, b loody  pattern o f  Rhodesia over the years 1965- 
1979. Given the greater internal resilience and external strike capacity o f  the 
Republic o f  South Africa, these prospects can again only be described as 
appalling.
A scenario o f  peacefully negotiated change within the Republic, w ould 
indeed be preferable. However, that is an argument for, not against, the 
im position o f  sanctions. The South African regime has not responded thus far to 
pressures by proposing change. T o  date, there has not been adequate pressure for 
these changes to be m ore than marginal and intended to perpetuate, not 
transform, the system. Econom ic sanctions remain the on ly serious proposal on 
the international agenda which appears to have som e potential for forcing South 
Africa and its internal and external supporters to  enter into negotiations for 
systemic transformation.
N O T E S
1 Most scenarios have not been elaborated fully. Indeed, the m ost interesting 
ones have arisen in conversations with leaders and intellectuals in the 
region and/or been fragmentarily expressed in editorials and otner articles.
Relatively little exists in the way o f  either national or regional studies 
on the impact o f  sanctions against the Republic o f  South A frica on  the 
independent Southern African slates. Rut there are tw o relatively 
comprehensive sets o f  papers on the countries o f  the region, sectors looked 
at from  a regional perspective and dependence on the Republic o f  South 
Africa. These are:
USAID, 1979: D evelopm ent N eed  and O pportunities fo r  C o-operation  
in Southern A frica , Washington. Main “ Report to the Congress”  plus 
annexes on nine o f  the countries (Tanzania is not within the region as 
defined by AID) and on  major sectors (e.g. transport and com m unication , 
agriculture, mining, health, education and manpower).
SADCC, 1979: Southern African Developm ent Co-ordination 
Conference, Arusha, July 1979.
1) Ten country papers.
2) Eight sectoral papers (steps toward econom ic integration;
dependence and co-ordination ; financial institutions and mechanisms;
energy, water and mineral resources; agriculture, forestry and fisheries;
em ploym ent and skills; transport and com m unications and trade).
3) Conference Speeches and Resolutions (m im eo) SADCC L ondon
Liaison Com m ittee, Chairman, High Commissioner A.J. Nsekela,
Tanzanian High Commission.
SADEX: The Southern African Developm ent Inform ation/ 
Docum entation Exchange publishes a bi-m onthly bibliographic review and 
guide, Vol. 1, No. 2 (A ugust/O ctober 1979) o f  which see F.A . Komegay 
and V.A. V ockerodt: “ Arusha and Regional Co-operation in Southern 
Africa: A  Preliminary Analysis o f  Resources for Research and Study” , 
SADEX, African Bibliographic Centre.
Som e additional material, in particular on m anpower and regional 
co-ordination, appears in the IDS Bulletin  1980-1983, Southern Africa,
P. Selwyn (editor), Institute o f  Developm ent Studies, University o f  Sussex, 
UK.
2 The case for rapid, phased extrication is in fact made in the 1979 USAID 
Report to Congress (AID 1979) and the Southern African Developm ent 
Co-ordination Conference Speeches (SADCC, 1979 (3 ); IDA, 1980). 
However, it is usually made quite independent o f  sanctions and with a 
time perspective and set o f  priorities rather different from  those which 
would be necessitated by adjustment to  sanctions whilst dependence 
remains at present levels.
3 All o f  this work is relatively imprecise and speculative. The AID  Report 
and SADCC country and sectoral papers (SADCC, 1979 (1 ), (2 ))  assemble 
the largest bodies o f  material though not in a sanctions adjustment 
context.
4 These factors are critical as discussed below  — especially section  6.
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5 See SADCC, 1979 (1 ), (2 ), (3) for data on present activities and proposed 
additions. See also AID, 1979.
6 Data largely derived from SADCC and USAID sectoral and country papers.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. but also discussions held by the author with officials in six o f  the 
countries over 1978-1979.
9 Data are highly imprecise because the RSA figures do not include -  by 
definition — non-legal and illegal migrants and probably undercount 
seasonal and agricultural sector migrants. See SADCC, 1979 (1 ), (2 ), AID, 
1979 for som e data and reference to further sources.
10 Estimated from SADCC, 1979 (1 ), (2 ); AID, 1979; and C. Colclough in 
IDS 1980.
11 All data are fragmentary. These are little more than impressions, derived 
from  looking at aggregated published data and talking to Treasury and 
Central Bank personnel in several o f  the countries.
12 Largely based on AID, 1979 and national trade statistics. The difficulties 
are that goods imported through South Africa are at.times classed as from  
the RSA, especially in the BLS states, whilst goods from  South Africa are 
som etim es entered as from  less sensitive sources (often  in ignorance o f 
their true origin). Further, South Africa deliberately presents its exports to 
independent African states in an unintelligible form in its published data; 
and South Africa/SW A (Namibia) trade data are not published as such.
13 Derived from AID, SADCC and national trade statistics. These data are 
relatively reliable. Exports through South Africa are excluded.
14 Partly derived from  SADCC, 1979 (1 ), (2 ); AID , 1979 and partly from  
discussions with officials and academics in the region.
15 This section is derived from  country data, 1965-1979 experience with 
Rhodesian sanctions and, in som e case, discussions with officials. Neither 
it nor the adjustment section purport to present official national 
calculations or contingency plans.
16 Based on SADCC sectoral papers on co-ordination and transport, and trade 
and AID sectoral papers on transport.
17 F ood  security on a regional basis received considerable attention at the 
1979 SADCC Conference, Arusha, and — judging from  statements — is o f  
considerable interest to bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.
18 SADCC, 1979 (2), (3).
19 See ECA, 1979.
20 South Africa has indicated to at least tw o neighbouring states that it 
expects to have adequate dom estic oil (from  coal, sugar and/or petroleum ) 
to export products refined from  it before the end o f  the 1980s. While this 
may be disinform ation, the “ disclosures”  were in the context o f  trade 
discussions and not diplom atic negotiations.
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South Africa is approaching the limits o f  its dom estic water supply and is 
encroaching on the flows needed by Swaziland and M ozam bique from 
international rivers. Swaziland is seeking to negotiate a water rights 
agreement and to create a national, multipurpose water-use programme. 
This is seen as a priority quite apart from  other aspects o f, or alterations 
in, relations with the Republic.
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